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Abstract
We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a
transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private in-
formation in financial markets. We implement a financial market with
sequential trading and transaction costs in the laboratory. According
to theory, eventually all traders neglect their private information and
abstain from trading (i.e., a no-trade informational cascade occurs).
We find that, in the experiment, informational no-trade cascades oc-
cur when theory predicts they should (i.e., when the trade imbalance
is sufficiently high). At the same time, the proportion of subjects ir-
rationally trading against their private information is smaller than in
a financial market without transaction costs. As a result, the overall
efficiency of the market is not significantly affected by the presence of
transaction costs. (JEL C92, D8, G14)
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1 Introduction
There is a long and widespread debate on the role of transaction costs in
the functioning of financial markets. Such costs can be imputed to different
reasons, such as brokerage commission fees, time involved in record keeping
and securities transaction taxes. It has been argued that transaction costs
can have negative effects on the process of price discovery. The presence
of even very small costs makes rebalancing expensive. Therefore, valuable
information can be held back from being incorporated into prices.
In recent years, such a debate has gained new strength, following the
proposals by many policy makers around the world to introduce security
transaction taxes (e.g., a Tobin tax),1 especially in emerging markets. Op-
ponents have stressed how these taxes can reduce the efficiency with which
markets aggregate information dispersed among their participants. In con-
trast, proponents have argued that such taxes only reduce excessive trading
and volatility, and can prevent the occurrence of financial crises.2
In this paper we will contribute to this debate by studying the effect of
transaction costs in a laboratory financial market. We will focus, in particu-
lar, on the role of transaction costs in the process of information aggregation.
We will first present a theoretical model similar to that of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), in which traders trade an asset with a market maker. The
market maker sets the prices at which traders can buy or sell. The prices
are updated according to the order flow, that is, to the sequence of trades.
Traders can buy or sell one unit of the asset or abstain from trading. If they
decide to trade, they have to pay a transaction cost.
We will show that the presence of transaction costs has a significant effect
on the ability of the price to aggregate private information dispersed among
market participants. Transaction costs cause “informational cascades:” situ-
ations in which all informed traders neglect private information and abstain
from trading.3 Such blockages of information can occur when the price is
far away from the fundamental value of the asset. Therefore, transaction
costs can cause long lasting misalignments between the price and the funda-
1In 1978, Tobin proposed that all major countries should introduce a tax on foreign-
exchange transactions.
2For a review of this debate, see Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003) and the comment
by Forbes (2003).
3For a review of the literature on informational cascades, see Gale (1996), Hirshleifer
and Teoh (2003), Chamley (2004), and Vives (2008).
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mental value of a security. Not only are informational cascades possible, but
they also occur with probability one. Eventually, the trade cost overwhelms
the importance of the informational advantage that the traders have on the
market maker, and therefore informed agents prefer not to participate in the
market, regardless of their private information.
These results contrast with those of Avery and Zemsky (1998), who show
that informational cascades cannot occur in financial markets where trade is
frictionless. In their work, agents always find it optimal to trade on the dif-
ference between their own information (the history of trades and the private
signal) and the commonly available information (the history of trades only).
For this reason, the price aggregates the information contained in the history
of past trades correctly. Eventually, the price converges to the realized asset
value. With transaction costs, in contrast, the convergence of the price to
the fundamental value does not occur since trading stops after a long enough
history of trades. With positive probability, no-trade cascades occur when
the price is far from the fundamental value of the asset, even for a very small
transaction cost.
To test the theory, we have run an experiment. A laboratory experiment
is particularly fit to test the theory since in the laboratory we observe the
private information that subjects receive and can study how they use it while
trading. In our laboratory market, subjects receive private information on
the value of a security and observe the history of past trades. Given these
two pieces of information, they choose, sequentially, whether they want to
sell, to buy or not to trade one unit of the asset at the price set by the market
maker. By observing the way in which they use their private information, we
directly detect the occurrence of cascades. The experimental results are in
line with the theoretical model. Indeed, cascades form in the laboratory as
the theory predicts (i.e., when the trade cost overwhelms the gain to trading).
Nevertheless, even if with trade costs cascades do arise, in the laboratory
the ability of the price to aggregate private information is not significantly
impaired. This happens because when transaction costs are present, there is
a lower incidence of irrational behavior and, in particular, of trading against
one’s own private information. The higher level of rationality makes the
price reflect private information more accurately. This explains why the
overall impact of transaction costs on the market efficiency is very small.
Our theoretical analysis lends credibility to the arguments against the
introduction of a security transaction tax (like a Tobin tax): it is true that
financial frictions impair the ability of prices to aggregate private informa-
4
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tion by making informational cascades possible. The occurrence of cascades
is confirmed by the laboratory experiment. As proponents of the tax have
suggested, however, financial frictions also reduce the occurrence of irrational
behavior, which improves the ability of the price to reflect subjects’ private
information. These two effects offset each other in the laboratory so that
the transaction cost does not significantly alter the financial market infor-
mational efficiency.
In the theoretical social learning literature, the impact of transaction
costs in financial markets has been first discussed by Lee (1998), who studies
a sequential trade mechanism in which traders are risk averse and receive
signals of different precision. Traders can trade more than once with the
market maker and can buy or sell different quantities (shares) of the asset.
Transaction costs trigger cascades followed by informational avalanches in
which previously hidden private information is suddenly revealed. Eventu-
ally, however, a complete stop of information occurs, which results in long-run
misalignments of the price with respect to the fundamental.4 In contrast to
Lee, we study the effect of transaction costs in a standard market microstruc-
ture model a` la Glosten and Milgrom. Our theoretical setup is particularly
useful for our experimental analysis since it is easy to implement in the labo-
ratory. The theoretical result on the occurrence of cascades in a Glosten and
Milgrom model with transaction costs was also shown in independent work
by Romano (2007).
There are only few experimental papers that have studied informational
cascades in financial markets.5 Cipriani and Guarino (2005a and 2005b) and
Drehmann et al. (2005) have tested Avery and Zemsky ’s model in the labo-
ratory and have found that, as theory predicts, informational cascades rarely
occur in a laboratory financial market in which traders trade for informational
reasons only and there are no transaction costs. More recently, Cipriani and
Guarino (2008b) have tested the same model using financial markets pro-
4In Lee the omplete stop of information arises because agents stop trading. Cipri-
ani and Guarino (2008a) show that a complete blockage of information can also arise
when agents herd buy or herd sell, because of traders’ heterogeneity (stemming from
non-informational reasons to trade, such as liquidity or hedging reasons).
5While there are only two experiments on herding and cascades in financial markets,
there is a much larger experimental literature testing the original herding models where
the price is fixed. Among the others, see the seminal paper by Anderson and Holt (1997)
and the papers by C¸elen and Kariv (2004), Drehmann et al. (2007), Goeree at al. (2007),
Huck and Oechssler (2000), Hung and Plott (2001), Ku¨bler and Weizsa¨cker (2004) and
Weizsa¨cker (2006).
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fessionals. Their results confirm the absence of informational cascades in a
frictionless financial market. Cipriani and Guarino (2008b) also test a model
where, because of informational uncertainty, traders may find it optimal to
ignore their private information and herd. They find that such a behavior
occurs in the laboratory, but less than theoretically predicted.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
model tested in the laboratory. Section 3 presents the experimental design.
Section 4 illustrates the experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Analysis
2.1 The model structure
In our economy there is one asset traded by a sequence of traders who interact
with a market maker. Time is represented by a countably infinite set of
trading dates indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, ...
The market
The fundamental value of the asset, V , is a random variable distributed
on {0, 100}, with Pr(V = 100) = p. At each time t, a trader can exchange
the asset with a specialist (market maker). The trader can buy, sell or decide
not to trade. Each trade consists of the exchange of one unit of the asset for
cash. The trader’s action space is, therefore, A ={buy, sell, no trade}. We
denote the action of the trader at time t by Xt. Moreover, we denote the
history of trades and prices until time t− 1 by ht.
The market maker
At any time t, the market maker sets the price at which a trader can buy
or sell equal to the expected value of the asset conditional on the information
available at time t:6
pt = E(V |ht).
The traders
There are a countably infinite number of traders. Traders act in an ex-
ogenously determined sequential order. Each trader, indexed by t, is chosen
6We do not allow the market maker to set a bid-ask spread. Since, as will be clear in
the next paragraph, the market maker trades with informed traders, he loses in expected
value each time he trades. This is not a problem since, in the experiment, an experimenter
played the role of the market maker.
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to take an action only once, at time t. When a trader is chosen to trade,
he observes a private signal on the realization of V . The signal is a random
variable St distributed on {0, 100}. We denote the conditional probability
function of St given a realization v of V by σ(st|v). We assume that, con-
ditional on the asset value v, the random variables St are independent and
identically distributed across time. In particular, we assume that
σ(0|0) = σ(100|100) = q > 0.5.
In addition to his signal, a trader at time t observes the history of trades
and prices and the current price. Therefore, his expected value of the asset
is E(V |ht, st).
Trading is costly: if a trader decides to buy or sell the asset, he must pay
a transaction cost c > 0. Every trader is endowed with an amount k > 0 of
cash.7 His payoff function U : {0, 100} × A × [0, 100]2 −→ R+ is defined as
U(v,Xt, pt) =


v − pt + k − c if Xt = buy,
k if Xt = no trade,
pt − v + k − c if Xt = sell.
The trader chooses Xt to maximize E(U(V,Xt, pt)|ht, st). Therefore, he
finds it optimal to buy whenever E(V |ht, st) > pt + c, and sell whenever
E(V |ht, st) < pt−c. He chooses not to trade when pt−c < E(V |ht, st) < pt+
c. Finally, he is indifferent between buying and no trading when E(V |ht, st) =
pt + c and between selling and no trading when E(V |ht, st) = pt − c.
It is worth emphasizing the simplifications introduced in this model com-
pared to the original Glosten and Milgrom model. First, we have only in-
formed traders, instead of both informed and noise traders. Second, we allow
the market maker to set one price only, instead of two prices, a bid price and
an ask price.8 Both choices are aimed to make the experiment simple and
do not affect the theoretical predictions we test in the laboratory.9 In par-
7We introduce k in the payoff function only for consistency with the experiment, where
subjects receive a fixed payment each time they are called to trade. The amount k should
not be interpreted as a cash constraint.
8Note that in the absence of noise traders, if we had allowed the market maker to set
a bid and an ask price, the equilibrium spread would have been so wide that informed
traders would have had no incentive to trade.
9In a working paper version of this article (Cipriani and Guarino 2006), we present a
similar model, in which, as in Glosten and Milgrom, there are noise traders and the market
maker sets two prices, a bid and an ask price. We show that such a model has the same
theoretical predictions as those presented here.
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ticular, adding noise traders to this setup would have made the experiment
more difficult to run without offering additional insights on the efficiency of
the market.
Finally, note that in actual financial markets, transaction costs may arise
from different reasons such as the material cost of executing the trade, bro-
kerage commission fees or a security transaction taxes. Different types of
transaction costs may lead to slightly different modelling choices. For in-
stance, securities transaction taxes are usually levied as a percentage tax on
the amount transacted, which would imply modelling the transaction cost
not as a lump-sum, but as a percentage. We chose a lump-sum cost in our
model because it is the easiest to implement in the laboratory. It is easy to
show, however, that the theoretical results that we present in this section
and then test in the experiment are independent of this choice.
2.2 Predictions
In order to discuss the model’s predictions, let us introduce the concept of
informational cascade. An informational cascade is a situation in which it is
optimal for a rational agent to make a decision independently of his private
information (i.e., to ignore his own private signal).
An informational cascade arises at time t when
Pr[Xt = x|ht, St = s] = Pr[Xt = x|ht]
for all x ∈ A and for all s ∈ {0, 100}.
In an informational cascade, the market maker is unable to infer the
trader’s private information from his actions and to update his beliefs on the
asset value. In other words, in an informational cascade trades do not convey
any information on the asset’s fundamental value.
From a behavioral point of view, an informational cascade can potentially
correspond to three different trading behaviors, which are of interest in the
analysis of financial markets:
1) Traders may disregard their private information and conform to the
established pattern of trade (e.g., after many buy orders, they all buy irre-
spective of their signal). In this case, we say that the traders are herding.
2) Alternatively, traders may disregard their private information and
trade against the established pattern of trade (e.g., after many buy orders,
8
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they all sell irrespective of their signal). In this case, we say that the traders
are engaging in contrarian behavior.
3) Finally traders may simply abstain from trading regardless of their
private information. In this case we say that there is a no-trade cascade.
We now prove that, in equilibrium, the first two situations never arise:
traders will never trade against their signal (i.e., engage in herding or con-
trarian behavior). In contrast, an informational cascade of no trades arises
almost surely as t goes to infinity.
In equilibrium, a) a trader either trades according to his private signal or
abstains from trading; and b) an information cascade in which a trader
does not trade regardless of his signal occurs almost surely as t goes to
infinity.
Let us first discuss point a. To decide whether he wants to buy, to sell or
not to trade the asset, an agent computes his expected value and compares
it to the price. If at time t he receives a signal of 100, his expected value will
be
E(V |ht, St = 100) = 100Pr(V = 100|ht, St = 100) =
100
qPr(V = 100|ht)
qPr(V = 100|ht) + (1− q)(1− Pr(V = 100|ht))
>
100Pr(V = 100|ht) = E(V |ht) = pt.
Similarly, if he receives a signal of 0, his expected value will be
E(V |ht, St = 0) < E(V |ht) = pt.
Therefore, an agent will never find it optimal to trade against his private
information (i.e., to buy despite a signal 0 or to sell despite a signal 100).
Let us now consider point b: as t goes to infinity, agents decide not to trade
with probability 1. We refer the reader to the Appendix for a formal proof.
Here let us note that, over time, as the price aggregates private information,
the informational content of the signal becomes relatively less important than
that of the history of trades. Therefore, after a sufficiently large number of
trades, the valuation of any trader and of the market maker will be so close
that the expected profit from trading will be lower than the transaction cost.
Every trader, independently of his signal realization, will decide not to trade.
9
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Note that when an informational cascade arises it never ends. This hap-
pens because, during a cascade, a trade does not convey any information on
the asset value. After a cascade has started, all the following traders have
the same public information as their predecessor (i.e., nothing is learned dur-
ing the cascade). Therefore, the subsequent traders will also find it optimal
to neglect their own private information and decide not to trade, thereby
continuing the cascade.
This result on traders’ behavior has an immediate implication for the
price during a cascade. The market maker will be unable to update his
belief on the asset value and, as a consequence, the price will not respond
to the traders’ actions. The price will remain stuck forever at the level it
reached before the cascade started. Note that such a level may well be
far away from the fundamental value of the asset. Therefore, in a market
with transaction costs, long-run misalignments between the price and the
fundamental value arise with positive probability. This suggests that, as
opponents of security transaction taxes have claimed, introducing such taxes
can significantly impair the process of price discovery.10
2.3 Parametrization
To run our experiment, we set particular values for the relevant parameters
of the model. In particular, we assumed the probability of the asset value
being 100, p, equal to 1
2
, and the precision of the signal, q, equal to 0.7.
Finally, we set the trade cost, c, equal to 9, which corresponds to 18% of the
unconditional expected value of the asset. This level of the transaction cost
is obviously greater than actual transaction costs or than reasonable taxes on
financial transactions.11 We chose such a high level so that the probability of
10Securities transaction taxes are usually levied as a percentage tax on the amount trans-
acted and not as a lump-sum tax. It is easy to show, however, that the theoretical results
that we present in this section would also hold if the transaction cost were modeled as a
percentage. We chose a lump-sum transaction cost only because it is easier to implement
in the laboratory.
11According to Domowitz and Madhavan (2001), in the U.S. stock market, trading
costs in the period 1990−1998 were equal to 2.2% of the mean returns. Habermeier and
Kirilenko report that in Sweden, between 1984 and 1991, taxes on equity trading were
levied at 0.5% and taxes on option trading were levied at 1%. These figures are lower
than our cost. One needs, however, to consider that following an informational event the
number of trades on a stock is very high. As a result, even low levels of transaction costs
or taxes can trigger a cascade.
10
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the transaction cost becoming binding was high enough to offer a sufficient
number of observations in our analysis. In theory, the transaction costs
become binding with probability 1 irrespective of their size, as the number
of trading dates goes to infinity. In the experiment, the number of trading
dates is, of course, finite, and this dictated the choice of c.12
3 The Experiment and the Experimental De-
sign
3.1 The experiment
We ran the experiment in 2001 in the Department of Economics at New
York University. We recruited 104 subjects from the university undergrad-
uate courses in all disciplines.13 They had no previous experience with this
experiment. We ran two treatments, with four sessions for each treatment.
In each session we used 13 participants, one acting as subject administrator
and 12 acting as traders. Let us describe here the procedures for the main
treatment:
1. At the beginning of the sessions, we gave written instructions (reported
in the Appendix) to all subjects. We read the instructions aloud in an
attempt to make the structure of the game common knowledge to all
subjects. Then, we asked for clarifying questions, which we answered
privately. Each session consisted of ten rounds of trading. In each
round we asked all subjects to trade one after the other.
2. The sequence of traders for each round was chosen randomly. At the
beginning of the session each subject picked a card from a deck of 13
numbered cards. The number that a subject picked was assigned to
him for the entire session. The card number 0 indicated the subject
administrator. In each round, the subject administrator called the
12In our experiment, each sequence of trades consists of 12 decisions, a relatively large
number compared to similar studies in the literature.
13Subjects were recruited by sending an invitation to a large pool of potential partic-
ipants. For each session of the experiment, we received a large number of requests to
participate. We chose the students randomly so that the subjects in the experiment were
unlikely to know each other.
11
Page 11 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
subjects in sequence by randomly drawing cards (without replacement)
from this same deck.
3. Before each round, an experimenter, outside the room, tossed a coin:
if the coin landed tails, the value of the asset for that round was 100,
otherwise it was 0. Traders were not told the outcome of the coin flip.
During the round, the same experimenter stayed outside the room with
two bags, one containing 30 blue and 70 white chips and the other 30
white and 70 blue chips. The two bags were identical. Each subject,
after his number was called, had to go outside the room and draw a
chip from one bag. If the coin landed tail the experimenter used the
first bag, otherwise he used the second. Therefore, the chip color was a
signal for the value of the asset. After looking at the color, the subject
put the chip back into the bag. Note that the subject could not reveal
the chip color to anyone.
4. In the room, another experimenter acted as market maker, setting the
price at which subjects could trade. After observing the chip color, the
subject entered the room. He read the trading price on the blackboard
and then declared aloud whether he wanted to buy, to sell or not to
trade. The subject administrator recorded all subjects’ decisions and
all trading prices on the blackboard. Hence, each subject knew not
only his own signal, but also the history of trades and prices.14
5. At the end of each round (i.e., after all 12 participants had traded once)
the realization of the asset value was revealed and subjects were asked
to compute their payoffs. All values were in a fictitious currency called
lira. In each round students were given an endowment of 100 lire. Each
time a student decided to buy or sell the asset, he would have to pay a
transaction cost of 9 lire. Therefore, students’ payoffs were computed
as follows. In the event of a buy, the subject obtained 100+(v−pt)−9
lire; in the event of a sell, he obtained 100+ (pt− v)− 9 lire; finally, if
he decided not to trade he earned 100 lire. After the tenth round, we
summed up the per round payoffs and converted them into dollars at
the rate of 1
65
. In addition, we gave $7 to subjects just for participating
14Subjects were seated far away from each other, all facing the blackboard. No commu-
nication was allowed in the room. The entrance was in the back of the classroom. When
making his decision, the subject was facing the blackboard, but not the other participants.
12
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in the experiment. Subjects were paid in private immediately after the
experiment and, on average, earned $22.50 for a 1.5 hour experiment.
3.2 The Price Updating Rule
The price was updated after each trade decision in a Bayesian fashion. When
a subject decided to buy, the price was updated up, assuming that he had
seen a positive signal. Similarly, when a subject decided to sell, the price was
updated down, assuming that the subject had observed a negative signal. In
the case of no trade, the price was kept constant. The rationale for this rule
is very simple. In equilibrium, when the trade cost was smaller than the
expected profit from buying or selling the asset, subjects should have always
followed their signal (i.e., they should have bought after seeing a positive
signal and sold after seeing a negative one). On the other hand, not trading
was an equilibrium decision when the expected profit from buying or selling
the asset was not higher than the trade cost. Therefore, in equilibrium, a
buy would reveal a positive signal, a sell a negative signal, and a no trade
would be uninformative. 15
Of course in the experiment we could observe decisions off the equilibrium
path. This could happen in two sets of circumstances: 1) a subject decided
not to trade when in equilibrium the trading cost was not binding; or 2) a
subject decided to buy or sell even though the trade cost overwhelmed the
gain to trading. In the first case, we left the price constant, whereas in the
second we updated the price after a buy (sell) as if the subject had received a
positive (negative) signal. As a result, independently of whether the observed
decision was on the equilibrium path, after a buy (sell) the price was always
updated as if it revealed a positive (negative) signal; after a no trade it was
always kept constant.
In the instructions, we explained to the subjects that the price would
move up after a buy, down after a sell, and would remain constant after a no
trade. We added that the amount by which we would change the price would
15The price updating rule is the same as that used by Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) and
Drehmann et al. (2005) in their benchmark treatments for an economy with no transaction
costs. Both Cipriani and Guarino and Drehmann et al. show that the results are robust
to changes to the price setting mechanism. Cipriani and Guarino show that the results are
robust to the case in which the price is set by subjects acting as market makers. Drehman
et al. show that they are robust to the case in which prices are set by an automaton taking
into account that subjects’ behavior deviates from the equilibrium predictions.
13
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depend on the “working of competitive markets: the price at each turn is
the best guess of the good value given the decisions taken by the subjects
in the previous turns.”16 It is worth mentioning that, with our price setting
rule, the price moved through a grid, that is, there were only few values at
which it was set during the entire experiment. The price movement on the
grid depended only on the difference between the number of buys and sells.
After a series of buys the price moved from 50 to 70, 84, 93, 97,...; after a
series of sells it moved from 50 to 30, 16, 7, 3,...; and after, for instance, two
buys and a sell, it would be set equal to 70. This made the updating rule very
easy for the subjects to understand. During the first three rounds (which we
do not consider in our data analysis), they had the opportunity to learn how
the price moved in response to the order flow.
It is important to remark that we chose a trade cost of 9 to avoid the
possibility that the cost could be binding only upon receiving a negative
signal and not upon receiving a positive one (or vice versa). To understanf
this point, consider a subject facing a price of 84. He would be (theoretically)
indifferent between buying and not trading upon receiving a positive signal
and would strictly prefer to sell upon receiving a negative one.17 18 Had
we chosen another level of the trade cost (for instance 10), theoretically a
no trade would have clearly revealed that the subject received a positive
signal (since he could never decide not to trade with a negative signal). To
be consistent with the theoretical framework, we should have updated the
price, but this would have made the updating rule quite complicated and
difficult to explain to the subjects.19
16Drehmann et al. show that, in an economy with no trade costs, the results are robust
to different presentations of the price updating rule (for instance, presenting a table with
all the possible prices instead of explaining the rule to subjects in the instructions).
17When the price is 84, a trader with a negative signal has an expected value of 70 and
therefore would make an expected profit of 84 − 70 − 9 = 5 lire by selling the asset. In
contrast, a trader with a positive signal has an expected value of 93 and therefore would
make an expected profit of 93− 84− 9 = 0 lire by buying the asset.
18Note that in the computation of prices, expectations and payoffs, we rounded off values
to the one. We chose this rounding since 1 lira was approximately equivalent to 1.5 cents
of a US dollar.
19Keeping the price constant after a no trade is optimal for the market maker only if
we impose some assumptions on the subjects’ behavior in the case of indifference. Not
updating the price after a no trade at the price of 84 is equivalent to assuming that an
indifferent subject in this case buys the asset, so that a no trade always is an off-the-
equilibrium path decision and does not convey any information on the signal that the
subject received.
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3.3 The Experimental Design
To study the effect of transaction costs we compared the results of the treat-
ment described above with a control treatment, identical in everything but
for the fact that trading was costless. From now on, we will refer to the
main treatment as the Transaction Cost (TC) treatment and to the other
treatment as the Control (CO) treatment. The data for the CO treatment
are taken from Cipriani and Guarino (2005a), who use them to study herd
behavior in financial markets.20
The results described in the next section refer to the last seven rounds
of each session only.21 Although the experiment was very ea y and subjects
did not have problems in understanding the instructions, we believe that
some rounds were needed to acquaint subjects with the procedures. By
considering only the last 7 sessions, we concentrate on the decisions taken
after the learning phase.22
Similarly, at a price of 93, a subject with a negative signal would value the asset 84 and,
therefore, would be indifferent between selling and no trading. A subject with a positive
signal would value the asset 97 and, because of the trade cost, would strictly prefer to
abstain from trading. Not updating the price after a no trade at a price of 93 is equivalent
to assuming that an indifferent subject in such a case does not trade, so that a no trade
does not convey any information on the private signal.
Considerations similar to those above can be made for no trade decisions at prices of 16
or 7.
The assumptions we made in the cases of indifference, theoretically legitimate, turn out
to be fairly consistent with actual behavior in the laboratory. Indeed, over the whole
experiment, the frequency of a no trade conditional on receiving a bad signal was very
close to the probability of a no trade conditional on receiving a good signal (52% and 51%
respectively), which implies that a rational market maker would have not updated the
price after a no trade. Given subjects’ behavior, for a price of 84, 93, 16 and 7, after a
no trade, a market maker should have updated the price to 86, 93, 20 and 7, very close to
our updating rule.
20Cipriani and Guarino ran several treatments with a flexible price and no transaction
costs. The data used here are those described in that paper under the label of Flexible
Price treatment. The data from that treatment are an obvious control for the TC treatment
since the experiment setup differs only in the absence of transaction costs (whereas the
other treatments in Cipriani and Guarino also differ in other dimensions). Note that both
the TC and the CO treatments were run in the same period with similar procedures and
with a similar pool of students.
21In each round, the 12 subjects were asked to trade in sequence. Therefore, the results
refer to 336 decisions per treatment.
22We replicated the analysis considering all ten rounds and obtained results (available
in the online appendix to the article) similar to those described in the remainder of the
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4 Results
4.1 Trading Behavior
Let us start the presentation of our results by discussing the average level of
rationality in the experiment. Given the sequential structure of the game, to
classify a decision as rational or irrational, we need to make some assumptions
on each subject’s belief on the choices of his predecessors. Following Cipriani
and Guarino (2005a) we define rationality by assuming that each subject
believes that all his predecessors are rational, that all his predecessors believe
that their predecessors are rational, and so on. Under this assumption, a
rational subject should always behave as predicted by the theoretical model.23
The level of rationality in the TC treatment is high (see Table 1): 82% of
the overall decisions in the laboratory were rational (i.e., not in contrast with
the theoretical model), while only 18% of actions were irrational. Such a level
of rationality is higher than the 65% in the CO treatment.24 This increase in
the level of rationality is mainly due to the drop in the proportion of irrational
no trades. In the CO treatment subjects should have always traded in order
to exploit their informational advantage with respect to the market maker.
Nevertheless, they decided not to trade in 22% of the cases, which added to
the level of irrationality. In the TC treatment, the proportion of no trades was
significantly higher (51%).25 These no trade decisions, however, happened
mostly when they should have occurred according to theory: indeed, 79% of
paper.
23In the experiment, subjects sometimes made decisions off-the-equilibrium path (i.e.,
decisions that could not be the outcome of a rational choice). An important issue is how to
update subjects’ beliefs after they observe such decisions. If the decision is a no trade, we
assume that the following subjects do not update their beliefs (which is consistent with our
price updating rule). If the decision is a buy (sell), we assume (again, consistently with our
price updating rule) that the following subjects update their beliefs as though it publicly
revealed a positive (negative) signal (i.e., the signal that implies the lower expected loss).
This last assumption is, in fact, quite innocuous. For instance, if we assumed that trades
that cannot be the outcome of a rational choice do not convey any information, our results
would be virtually identical since, in the TC treartment, we observed only four such trades
(out of 336 decisions).
24According to the Mann-Whitney test, the proportion of rational trades is significantly
different in the two experiments (p-value=0.03). Throughout the paper, the independent
observations for the Mann-Whitney tests are the per-session averages.
25The p-value for the null that the proportion of no trades is the same in the two
experiments equals 0.03 (Mann-Witney test).
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no trades occurred when the difference between the trader’s expected value
and the price was not higher than the transaction cost and, therefore, trading
could not be profitable.
Table 1: Rational and irrational decisions
TC treatment
Rational Decisions 82%
Buying or Selling 41%
No Trading 41%
Irrational Decisions 18%
Buying or Selling 8%
No Trading 10%
Total 100%
CO treatment
Rational Decisions 65%
Irrational Decisions 35%
Buying or Selling 13%
No Trading 22%
Total 100%
To understand better the relationship between no trading and rational
behavior, we computed the proportion of no trade decisions for different
levels of the absolute value of the trade imbalance. The trade imbalance
at time t is defined as the difference between the number of buys and the
number of sells taken by subjects from time 1 until time t − 1. As the
trade imbalance increases in absolute value, the expected profit from trading
becomes smaller and smaller, thus reducing traders’ incentives to trade upon
their information.
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Table 2:
Proportion of no-trade decisions for different levels of the
absolute value of the trade imbalance
TC treatment
Trade Imbalance No Trades
0-1 21%
2-3 67%
>3 78%
CO treatment
Trade Imbalance No Trades
0-1 16%
2-3 22%
>3 33%
Both in the TC and in the CO treatment, the frequency of no trades
increases monotonically with the absolute value of the trade imbalance. In
the CO treatment, however, this increase is modest, the proportion of no
trades going up from 16% with a trade imbalance between −1 and 1 to 33%
with a trade imbalance greater than 3 or smaller than −3. In contrast, in the
TC treatment the proportion of no trades jumps from 21% when the absolute
value of the trade imbalance is at most 1 to 67% when the absolute value is
2 or 3. The proportion of no trades is even higher when the trade imbalance
is higher than 3 or lower than −3. Since, in the TC treatment, for a trade
imbalance of at most 1, not trading was irrational, while it was rational
after a trade imbalance of 2, these results confirm that no trade decisions
occurred mainly when they were rational. In a nutshell, the trade cost had
a significant impact on subjects’ decisions exactly when theory suggests that
it should become binding.26
26In an earlier working paper version of their article, Drehmann et al. report the results
of a treatment with transaction costs. As do we, they find that transaction costs increase
the proportion of no trades (although to a much lower extent). In contrast to our results,
however, in their experiment the proportion of rational no trades is modest. In particular,
they find that, out of 26% of no trades, only 12% are rational. It is not easy to compare our
results to theirs since they ran several transaction cost treatments with various parameter
values (different from ours) and report aggregate statistics for all treatments. Furthermore,
in their experiments, the size of the transaction cost is smaller than in ours (they ran two
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Rational no trade decisions are not the only reason for the increase in the
level of rationality in the TC treatment as compared to the CO treatment.
The increase in the level of rationality is also due to a different proportion
of trading against private information. In the CO treatment, 13% of all de-
cisions are irrational buys and sells against private information. In contrast,
in the TC treatment only 6% of decisions are irrational trades against the
private signal.27
Following Cipriani and Guarino (2005a), we can explain part of the irra-
tional buying or selling decisions in the CO treatment in terms of contrarian
behavior and (a modest proportion of) herd behavior. Herding refers to the
situation in which a trader with a signal in contrast with the past history
of trades (i.e., a positive signal after many sells or a negative signal after
many buys) decides to disregard his private information and follow the mar-
ket trend.28 In contrast, contrarianism refers to the situation in which a
trader with a signal that reinforces the past history of trades (i.e., a pos-
itive signal after many buys or a negative signal after many sells) decides
to disregard both his private information and the market trend.29 In Table
3 we report the proportion of herding and contrarian behavior. In the CO
treatment, subjects herded 12% of the time in which herding could arise, and
they acted as contrarians in 19% of the time in which contrarianism could
occur. In contrast, in the TC treatment, herding and contrarianism occurred
sets of treatments, with a 1% and a 5% transaction cost). It should be noted that a
transaction cost of 1% or 5% becomes binding only when the absolute trade imbalance
is quite high (4 and 6 respectively), but this seldom happens if there are relatively few
trades in each round. Drehmann et al. (2002) attribute the high percentage of irrational
no trades to a psychological effect that makes subjects abstain from trade even when it
would not be rational.
27Using the Mann-Whitney test, the p-value for the null that the proportion of trades
against private information is the same in the two experiments equals 0.03. Note that the
6% indicated in the text differs from the percentage (8%) in Table 1 since 2% of trades
were irrational not because they did not agree with private information, but because the
trade cost was greater than the expected profit from trading.
28In particular, following Cipriani and Guarino, we say that in period t there is a
situation of potential herd behavior when the trade imbalance (in absolute value) is at
least 2 and the subject receives a signal against it. If the subject trades against the signal
we say that he herds.
29In particular, following Cipriani and Guarino, we say that in period t there is a
situation of potential contrarian behavior when the trade imbalance (in absolute value) is
at least 2 and the subject received a signal agreeing with it. If the subject trades against
the signal, we say that he engages in contrarian behavior.
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in only 7% of the cases in which they could have happened; indeed, in most
of these cases subjects preferred not to trade.30 This explains why both con-
trarianism and herding are even less pronounced in the TC than in the CO
treatment, which in turn explains why the proportion of irrational trades is
lower.31 32
Table 3: Herding and Contrarian Behavior
Herd Behavior TC treatment CO treatment
Herding 7% 12%
Following Private 29% 46%
No Trade 64% 42%
Relevant cases 70 66
Contrarian Behavior
Contrarian behavior 7% 19%
Following private 23% 63%
No trade 69% 18%
Relevant cases 147 132
4.2 No-trade Cascades
Table 4 shows the sequences of traders’ decisions in the TC treatment. We
highlighted in gray those periods in which a subject took a decision facing a
30Note that, according to the Mann-Whitney test, the proportion of contrarianims is
significantly different in the two treatments (p-value = 0.03), but the proportion of herding
is not (p-value=0.26). This result confirms the finding by Cipriani and Guarino that in
the presence of the price mechanism herd behavior rarely arises.
31It is also interesting to note that when the trade imbalance (in absolute value) was at
most 1 (and, therefore, the trade cost was not binding), irrational decisions to buy or sell
amount to 4%, whereas they amount to 9% in the CO treatment. Although this difference
is not significant (p-value=0.14), it seems to suggest that, with trade costs, subjects are
more careful in making their decisions (and, therefore, they use their information more
efficiently). This may have added to the rationality in the TC treatment.
32In contrast to our results, in Drehmann et al. (2002) the proportion of irrational
buying and selling against one’s own signal is not significantly reduced by the presence of
transaction costs. The reason may be that in their experiments, since transaction costs
are lower, the overall proportion of buying and selling on the total number of decisions
decreases with respect to the treatment with no trade costs, but only slightly (from 81% to
77% or 72%, for a transaction cost of 1% or 5% respectively). As a result, the proportion
of rational buy and sell orders is also not affected substantially by the transaction cost.
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price greater than or equal to 93 or smaller than or equal to 7 and, therefore,
could have rationally chosen not to trade regardless of his private information.
In bold we indicated those decisions that were indeed no trades.
The table clearly illustrates the pervasiveness of no trade decisions. In
many rounds (19 out of the 28) there were indeed long sequences of no trades.
In almost all the cases, the no trade decisions started when the price reached
the level of 7 or of 93. In four rounds only (IV − 4, IV − 5, IV − 7, IV − 8)
sequences of no trades started at a price of 16 or 84 and, even more rarely,
at prices closer to 50, the unconditional expected value of the asset.33
[Insert Table 4 about here]
We must stress that our experiment offers a particularly tough test of
the prediction that, when trade is costly, cascades of no trades occur in
the financial market. At a price of 7 or 93, the expected payoff from trading
becomes equal to or lower than zero, depending on the signal that the subject
receives. At the price of 93, a rational agent receiving a negative signal has
an expected value of 84 and is indifferent between selling and not trading
(since the trade cost is set at 9).34 Analogously, when the price is 7, a rational
agent receiving a positive signal has an expected value of 16 and is indifferent
between buying and not trading.35 Therefore, in our setup, deviations from
a cascade of no trades are not necessarily irrational. A no trade cascade,
as defined in Section 2, theoretically occurs at prices of 7 and 93 under the
assumption that an indifferent agent always decides not to trade. In the
laboratory, however, we may expect some subjects to follow a different (and,
still rational) strategy, thus breaking the cascade. Furthermore, it must be
noticed that at a price of 84 a rational agent receiving a positive signal is
indifferent between buying and not trading. Therefore, theoretically, the
price of 93 can only be reached if an indifferent agent buys with positive
33The Roman numeral denotes the session. The Arabic numeral indicates the round
within each session. For instance, II − 5 refers to the fifth round of the second session.
Note that we are reporting only the last 7 rounds of each session of the experiment. This
is why, for instance, the first round in session II is labeled II − 4.
34In contrast, a rational agent receiving a positive signal has an expected value of 97,
and, therefore, his optimal choice is to abstain from trading.
35In contrast, a rational agent receiving a negative signal has an expected value of 7,
and, therefore, his optimal choice is to abstain from trading.
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probability. Similarly, a no trade cascade can arise at the price of 7 only
if an indifferent agent at the price of 16 sells with positive probability. In
summary, in our set up, cascades are more difficult to form and easier to
break.
What happened in the experiment? Given the signal realizations, if all
subjects had been rational and followed the rules indicated in the previous
section in the cases of indifference, a no trade cascade would have occurred
in 25 of the 28 rounds.36 In fact, in the TC treatment sequences of no trades
did occur in 19 out of these 25 rounds. Sequences of no trades often arose
in the laboratory and were almost never broken. Therefore, the theoretical
prediction of the model finds strong support in the laboratory.
4.3 The Price Path
Let us now discuss how the subjects’ behavior affected the price path. We are
particularly interested in studying the ability of prices to aggregate private
information in the laboratory. To this aim, we computed the distance be-
tween the final actual price (i.e.,the price after all subjects have traded) and
the full information price (i.e., the price that the market maker would have
chosen if the signals had been public information). Figures 1 and 2 show this
distance in the TC treatment and contrast it to that in the CO treatment.
Two interesting differences emerge. First, in the TC treatment we have one
instance in which distance between the final price and the full information
price was greater than 50. This was the instance in which a misdirected cas-
cade arose (i.e., the full information price, 84, was above the unconditional
expected value, whereas the actual price, 16, was below it). This never hap-
pened in the CO treatment. Second, in the CO treatment 50% of the time
the difference between the final price and the full information price was less
than 5 lire, whereas this happens only 21% of the time in the TC treatment.
Since with trade costs subjects often stopped trading whenever the price was
7 or 93, it was less common for the difference between the full information
price and the final price to become very small.
In the TC treatment the average distance between the final actual price
and the full information price is 14.5 lire. Had subjects behaved in a perfectly
36In particular, this is true under the assumption that an indifferent agent buys (sells)
with probability 1 when the price is 84 (16) (which is the assumption used to compute the
equilibrium price).
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rational manner, such a distance would have been 14 lire.37 This reflects the
similarity between the behavior observed in the laboratory and that predicted
by the theory.
In contrast, in the CO treatment, the distance between final actual prices
and full information prices is 12 lire. Theoretically, however, with no trade
costs the distance should have been 0. Therefore, in the CO treatment, there
was a misalignment of the price with the fundamental value of the asset
(which is expressed by the full information price) due to the irrational trades
in the laboratory. In contrast, in the TC treatment, the inability of the
price to aggregate private information completely cannot be attributed to a
significant discrepancy between theoretical and actual behavior: indeed the
level of irrationality (and, more specifically, the proportion of trades against
private information) is significantly lower than in the CO treatment. The
distance between actual and full information prices is due to the presence
of transaction costs, which reduced the incentive of subjects to reveal their
private information by placing orders on the market.
In conclusion, the overall effect of transaction costs on the informational
efficiency of prices is ambiguous: on the one hand, they reduce the incentive
for subjects in the laboratory to trade irrationally against their private infor-
mation; on the other hand, they increase (both theoretically and experimen-
tally) the incentive to abstain from trading altogether. In our experiment,
these two forces offset each other, and, as a result, the ability of prices to
aggregate private information is not significantly different from the case of a
frictionless market such as that implemented in the CO treatment.
These results help to shed some light on the possible effect of a tax on
financial transactions such as a Tobin tax. It has been argued by opponents
of the tax that such a tax would generate misalignments of asset prices with
respect to the fundamentals. Our theoretical analysis supports this view: by
introducing a wedge between the expectations of the traders and of the mar-
ket maker, a tax on financial transaction may prevent the aggregation of the
private information dispersed among market participants. The occurrence of
cascades is confirmed by the laboratory. On the other hand, as proponents of
the tax have suggested, a tax on financial transaction reduces the incidence
37This theoretical distance is obtained using, for the cases of indifference, the same
assumptions explained above when we discussed informational cascades. An alternative
way of computing the last price would be to assume that when indifferent, subjects always
followed their signals. Under this assumption, the average distance would have been 10
lire.
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of irrational trading by market participants and, in particular, of herding and
contrarianism. These two effects offset each other in the laboratory so that
the introduction of a security transaction tax does not significantly alter the
ability of the price to aggregate private information.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the effects of transaction costs in financial markets through
a laboratory experiment. We observed cascades in our laboratory market
when the theory predicts that they should indeed arise. Informational cas-
cades impair the process of information aggregation and may create a mis-
alignment between the price and the fundamental value of an asset. In this
sense, our results highlight the negative effect of transaction costs on the pro-
cess of price discovery. Our experimental results, however, suggest that one
should be cautious in concluding that transaction costs have a strong effect
on the informational efficiency of the financial market. In fact we found that
the presence of a transaction cost does not affect the convergence of the price
to the fundamental value in a significant way. This is due to the fact that
transaction costs reduce the frequency with which agents irrationally trade
against their private information.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the proposition, we show that there exists a time T such that for
any t > T , the following two inequalities will be satisfied almost surely:
E[V |ht]− c < E[V |ht, St = 0] (A1)
and
E[V |ht, St = 100]− c < E[V |ht]. (A2)
When these two inequalities are satisfied, a trader chooses not to trade
independently of his signal (i.e., we have an informational cascade where all
traders abstain from trading). It is easy to prove that (A1) and (A2) are
satisfied if and only if pt < a or pt > b, where 0 < a < 50 and 50 < b < 100.
38
Furthermore, since the price is a conditional expected value, it is a bounded
martingale with respect to the history of trades.39 As a result, it will converge
38We omit the proof, which is a simple application of Bayes’s rule. The reader interested
in a more detailed proof of the no-trade cascade result (in a model with noise traders and a
bid-ask spread) will find it useful to read the working paper version of this article (Cipriani
and Guarino 2006).
39Indeed, E(Pt+1|Ht) = E(E(V |Ht+1)|Ht) = E(V |Ht) = Pt.
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to a random variable as t goes to infinity. Let us denote this random variable
by P
∞
.
We now prove the proposition by contradiction. Let us assume that the
price converges to a value in the interval [a, b]. There are three possibilities:
a) the price converges to a value such that both a trader with a high and
one with a low signal follow their private information. In this case, the price
is updated as in a market without transaction costs. Therefore, after a buy
or sell the price is updated up or down of an amount strictly greater than
ε > 0, a contradiction.40
b) the price converges to a value such that traders with a high signal buy
and traders with a low signal abstain from trading. In this case, the market
maker will update the price after a no trade as if it were a sell. The same
argument presented in point a) holds.
c) the price converges to a value such that traders with a low signal sell
and traders with a high signal abstain from trading. In this case, the market
maker will update the price after a no trade as if it were a buy. The same
argument presented in point a) holds.
Therefore, the realizations of P
∞
must belong either to the interval (0, a)
or (b, 100), which proves the proposition.
40We omit the proof, which is a simple application of Bayes’s rule.
27
Page 27 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Page 28 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
